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Even if convergences are to be observed among the orientations adopted 
by higher education policies in European countries within the last 
twenty years, many researchers (for instance Kogan et al. 20001; 
Musselin 2000a) show that these converging orientations always cope 
with national particularities: they hardly reduce the discrepancies 
among the different European national systems of higher education. 
They still are characterized by strong national features, one of the most 
striking national patterns of each system being its academic labor 
market. Salaries, status, recruitment procedures, workloads, career 
patterns, promotion rules, are very different from one country to an 
other (Enders 2000, 2001; Musselin 2004). 
Nevertheless, these specific national academic labor markets are 
experiencing a common evolution that can be summed up as the 
growing emergence of more regulated internal labor markets,1 while 
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simultaneously the qualification of the academic production (knowl 
edge) as a public good is questioned and while academic activities rely 
less on individual autonomy than before. Two main transformations 
can be mentioned: the development of individual assessment and 
incentive devices in universities; and the increasing role of higher edu 
cation institutions in the issues previously in the domains of the aca 
demic profession. 
Instead of trying to draw an extensive panorama of the recent 
measures undertaken in all (or at least many) European academic labor 
markets, this paper relies on a limited number of cases and on empirical 
studies recently collected on France and Germany.2 The evolution en 
gaged in the two countries will be reviewed in order to show that they 
lead, by different roads, to more regulated "internal labor markets". It 
will also be argued that this is a general trend. 
In the Section "Concluding discussion", the implications linked to 
this evolution and the questions they raise, the role of the academic 
profession, and the transformation of the status of scientific and ped 
agogical activities will be discussed. 
France and Germany: two different academic labor markets, two different 
professional models for academics 
A traditional way of assessing change is first to describe the previ 
ously existing situation and second to present the transformations 
under way. I shall thus start by opposing the German and the French 
academic labor markets and by describing how they were charac 
terized and the implicit professional models they are built on. But in 
order to describe these two situations, agreement must first be 
reached on the features to be taken into account, in order to com 
pare academic labor markets. 
A. How to characterize academic labor markets and analyze them 
One common way of describing academic labor markets is to start with 
a rather formal description (procedures to access, status, different 
grades structuring the career development, salaries determination...) 
and to develop the consequences or implications, either in quantitative 
terms (average salaries, average age of access, etc.) or in qualitative ones 
(aging population vs. young one, blocked careers vs. attractive ones...). 
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This is common in comparative studies on academic careers (Altbach 
2000; Clark 1983; Enders 2000, 2001), but often leads to neglecting the 
analysis of the mechanisms producing such results and the specific 
dynamics of these labor markets. 
Some economists adopt a rather different perspective and qualify 
academic labor markets as 
"a-typical" (see for instance Siow 1995), 
trying to explain/discredit market anomalies (see for instance Alchian 
(1977); Carmichael (1988) on tenure). These studies are often normative 
and are also strictly adapted to the North American situation and 
difficult to apply to other countries. 
Drawing on the comparison led on hiring decisions at some Ameri 
can, French and German universities and on the analysis of these 
respective labor markets, I shall suggest characterizing them by the 
specific interplay between four factors. 
The first one deals with selection devices. Many variations can be 
observed between two opposed mechanisms. The first refers to "con 
course" or 
"tournament"3(Lazear and Rosen 1981): many candidates 
apply for a position open to recruitment or to promotion and their 
comparative assessment will lead to the choice of one of them. The 
second mechanism refers to situations in which selection depends on the 
satisfaction of required criteria by a candidate who is not competing 
with others. These criteria can be purely bureaucratic and very explicit 
(as for promotion by seniority: getting older is enough to get a better 
salary) or multi modal and less explicit; furthermore when the criteria 
are not satisfied, the candidate can either remain in his/her previous 
situation4 or be excluded according to the so called "up or out" device.5 
These are of course ideal-typical devices and many academic labor 
markets mix different ones and develop hybrid forms. Moreover, much 
existing devices are not "pure".6 But each system can nevertheless be 
characterized by a dominant style. 
The second factor refers to the length and to the role of the pre 
tenure period. First, while before tenure the exposure to competitive 
situations is inescapable if one wants to stay in the running for an 
academic position, it becomes more avoidable (mostly depending on the 
incentive structure at work) after it. Second, the "function" assigned to 
the pre-tenure period varies between two extreme roles: a way to reveal 
competencies on the one hand, or a time for apprenticeship on the 
other. The division of work and the relationships between tenured/non 
tenured staff are affected by the function played: they are less marked 
when the revelation of competence is the main objective than when 
apprenticeship is. 
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The third factor concerns the balance between internal and exter 
nal labor markets. For Doeringer and Piore (1971), internal labor 
markets are defined as "an administrative unit, such as a manufac 
turing plant, within which the pricing and allocation of labor is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures" (1971: 
1-2): I thus suggest speaking of internal academic labor markets 
when career development occurs within a university and when rules 
and incentives 
"organize" such a development.7 It is more difficult to 
closely follow the notion of external labor markets defined by the two 
economists as a situation in which 
"pricing, allocating, and training 
decision are controlled directly by economic variables" (Doeringer 
and Piore: 2). As I argued (Musselin 1996) it is not price but quality 
which is the operating mechanism in the adjustment between supply 
and demand in academic labor markets.8 Thus, in academia, I suggest 
speaking of external academic labor markets when career develop 
ments rely on the success of being hired for positions open in other 
institutions than one's own. 
For the above mentioned reason, a fourth and last factor deals 
with the determination of the price of the academics. If it does not 
result from the adjustment between supply and demand, how is it set 
and by whom? A point common to the countries studied is that the 
recruiters (the peers) are never the price negotiators. But given this 
factor, various situations may occur. In France there is no negotia 
tion and salaries are fixed by bureaucratic rules applied by the 
ministry administration; while in the American case the dean nego 
tiates the salaries, the start-up funds, the housing, the medical 
insurance etc. with the candidate.9 
The four factors presented above constitute the analytic framework 
used now to point up the specific dynamics and "rules of the game" on 
which each of the French and the German academic labor markets 
relied until recently. 
B. German and French academic labor markets and the underlying 
professional models 
Using this analytic framework, France and Germany appear to be 
largely different, except for the predominance of "tournaments" for 
recruitment and promotions in both countries and the high level of 
uncertainties attached to such events: the number of open positions as 
well as the number and 
"quality" of the candidates who apply may vary 
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each year, the opacity about the criteria used by each hiring commit 
tee, etc. 
French academic labor markets 
In the French system,10 time limited contracts first of all concern doc 
toral students11 and some specific positions that cannot be renewed 
more than once,12 whereas the access to permanent positions happens, 
rather early 
- 
on average 33 years of age for a first position as "tenured 
assistant professor" (ma?tre de conf?rences). Access to these tenured 
positions does not mean access to professional autonomy because there 
often is a perceptible division13 of work and responsibilities among 
ma?tres de conf?rences and professors, even if one cannot speak of a 
"disciple to master" relationship. Interviewed ma?tres de conf?rences for 
instance feel that their judgments weigh less than those of the professor 
on the hiring committees.14 Furthermore, this early tenure implies that 
institutions have to make a committed decision (for the next 30 years) at 
a moment when information on the candidates' competencies are still 
rather limited. As a consequence, there are almost no possibilities for 
reversibility and some French academics are still ma?tres de conf?rences 
when they retire.15 
This situation combines with the coexistence in France of external 
labor markets which allocate symbolic resources rather than monetary 
or material ones, and poorly regulated internal labor markets. 
Let me start with external labor markets. Even if theoretically equal 
on paper, French universities (or departments) do not all have the same 
reputation. Most of the time, well known institutions recruit professors 
among candidates who are not local ones. Conversely, ambitious aca 
demics try to get a position in a prestigious department they would like 
to join. Going back on the "market", i.e., sending applications for 
recruitment to other institutions than your own, or trying to succeed to 
the agr?gation du sup?rieur}6 is thus the best way to "make a career". 
But only prestige is at stake, because the salaries depend on bureaucratic 
rules and are the same for all professors whatever the university or the 
discipline they belong to. Furthermore the hiring process (almost17) 
never is an opportunity for negotiating about working conditions or 
staff. The only way to improve one's research potential is to find con 
tracts with firms or local authorities (d?partement level or region), and/ 
or to be funded by one of the French national research institutions18 
(CNRS, INSERM etc); but such processes are completely disconnected 
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from recruitment decisions and the university management are not 
associated with them. 
If one now looks at internal labor markets, they are "poorly regu 
lated". There exist few incentives and most of them are not compelling. 
The main possibility consists in making a career within one's institution, 
i.e. being recruited as ma?tre de conf?rences by a university where one 
prepared his/her thesis, and being hired as a professor there too. 
Cytermann et al. (2002) assessed that 55% of French professors got 
their professorship at the university where they were ma?tres de conf? 
rences.19 Even if not rare, these practices are not legitimate: "local 
recruitment" is often presented as one indicator of the "low morality" 
(Lazar 2001) of the French academic profession. I would argue 
(Musselin forthcoming) that it is also a rational answer to the con 
straints faced by the recruiters (hiring committees have only one and a 
half months to assess the dossiers), a good way to control uncertainties 
about the candidates' quality, and a way to reward institutional com 
mitment (in teaching or services for instance). Moreover it shows that 
recruitment plays a double role in France: it is a way to hire or be hired 
on the external labor market (as described in the previous paragraph) 
but it can simultaneously be used as a way of providing internal pro 
motion. 
These characteristics of the French academic labor market reveal a 
very protective professional model, as stressed by the early occurrence 
of tenure and the scarcity of career incentives. But it is also based on 
individual auto-regulation as shown by the facultative character of 
these incentives. This reveals the weakness of the link between the 
French universities and the faculty members: peers of the discipline 
are decisive in the recruitment decision-making but the institutions 
are excluded from the management of the faculty staff and certainly 
cannot be described as employers. French academics are sheltered by 
their university, not employed by it. It is furthermore a weakly dif 
ferentiated profession: the division of work is not very pronounced 
among faculty members and simultaneously the vertical differentia 
tion between the more and the less highly reputed academics is rather 
narrow. 
German academic labor markets 
The German situation before the 2000 reforms was radically different 
from the French one in many aspects.20 First of all, there is a lasting 
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very demanding pre-tenure period for the assistants (Mittelbau). They 
are expected to go from one contract to another (with strict and con 
straining rules for renewal) and to finally write a Habilitation (the 
average age for Habilitation being 42 years of age, cf. Mayer 2000) 
which is the minimal prerequisite for applying for a tenured professor 
position. This long, selective and risky process is also characterized by 
the dependence of the assistants on the tenured professors to find the 
next contracts21 and to develop scientific thematics: they are not con 
sidered as "autonomous" researchers but as a work force simulta 
neously learning an occupation and engaged in a "disciple to master" 
kind of relationship. The Habilitation is thus a decisive event symbol 
izing the end of the apprenticeship process and the beginning of scien 
tific independence. 
Those who survive this long pre-tenure period and become tenured 
professors are then launched on a career which is exclusively based on 
external labor market mechanisms. The only way to be promoted from 
"C3" (associate professor) to "C4" (full professor), or to negotiate 
better salaries or better working conditions (equipment, budget for 
books, number of assistants) is to apply for a position in another 
institution and to be offered a Ruf there. Recruitment thus plays a 
crucial role in the German career development process and universities 
intervene on such issues: they can modify the choices made on the 
department level and they lead the negotiations with the selected can 
didate on the salary s/he will be offered if s/he comes. But, once this 
agreement is reached, the university loses any kind of influence on the 
newcomer, as there exists (existed) no internal labor markets at all: it 
was impossible to achieve career development within one's institution. 
The German universities can thus be described as "human capital 
riskers". They invest resources on a person with the hope that they will 
recover their investment thanks to the reputation, research contracts, 
pedagogical assets etc. s/he will bring. 
The professional model behind this is also based on individual self 
regulation (C3 professors are not compelled to apply for a C4 position), 
but it is less protective than the French. As a result, the division of labor 
is much stronger between tenured and non-tenured (Enders 1956: 
54-55). This is also one of the motors of this professional model: the 
risky and long pre-tenure situation is balanced by the fact you benefit 
from it (thanks to the Mittelbau positions you will be allocated) once 
you become a professor. Furthermore German universities have a more 
important role than French ones: they participate in the differentiation 
process among academics through their action on price setting and 
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"investment". As a consequence, the vertical differentiation is greater 
than in France. The main characteristics of the academic labor market 
in the two countries can be summed up in the following Table 1. 
French and German academic labor markets clearly obey very dif 
ferent mechanisms, rules and principles. Such divergences are not only 
formal: they simultaneously impact on and reflect different professional 
models, i.e., different conceptions, structures and levels of differentia 
tion within the academic profession. But these traditional models are 
experiencing some change. 
The emergence of more regulated internal labor markets in France and 
Germany and in most European countries as well 
The on-going evolution of the French and German labor markets re 
veals the emergence of converging trends which can also be observed in 
many other countries in Europe. 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the academic labor market in France and Germany 
France Germany 
Recruitment and promotions 
Promotion by seniority 
Selection devices 
Tournaments 
Satisfaction of criteria 









Short and limited to PhD 
preparation 
Apprenticeship 
External labor market is the 
usual way to have a successful 
career. There exist weakly 
regulated internal labor 
markets 
Salaries are fixed according 
to strict administrative scales. 
Barely no negotiation on work 
conditions 
Protective professional model 
and a weakly differentiated 
profession 
Recruitment and promotions 
Long (finish around 42 
years old) 
Apprenticeship 
External labor market is 
the only way to make a 
career. There are no internal 
labor markets 
Salaries are fixed according 
to an administrative scale. 
Negotiations on work 
conditions especially for 
full professors (C4) 
positions 
Strong differentiation and 
division of work between 
tenured and non-tenured 
staff 
Universities invest in the 
professors they recruit 
Relationships between Academics are sheltered by 
universities and their their universities 
academic staff 
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The emergence of more regulated internal labor markets in France and 
Germany 
In recent year, some new measures have been introduced in France and 
in Germany. The recent German reforms22 introduced two 
major innovations. The first deals with the creation of "Juniorprofes 
sor"23 positions. It consists in three-year contracts which can be 
renewed once. At the end of the six year-period, the candidate can apply 
for a professor position. A Habilitation is no longer needed for pro 
motion and the Juniorprofessoren are recognized as "autonomous" 
academics: they are expected to develop their own research projects and 
to reveal their competencies rather than to be apprentices. At least for 
the access to professorships, it breaks the traditional rules which asso 
ciated promotions and access to tenured position with institutional 
mobility and introduces new principles of selection: the renewal of the 
three-year contract and the provision that access to a professorship 
should rely on the satisfaction of criteria rather than on pure "tour 
naments". 
The second innovation consists in the introduction of merit-salaries 
for tenured professors. Part of their salary is fixed, but the other part is 
variable. It gives the university the chance to differently manage its 
faculty staff after the recruitment decision. Professors who would not 
"bring return on investments" could see their income affected. 
As a result, internal labor markets 
- 
which did not exist before - are 
promoted in Germany through the possibility of internal career devel 
opment and by the creation of some incentive mechanisms. 
In France the evolution is more diffuse and more staggered over time. 
Some first steps were passed in the 1990s. A first measure concerned the 
weakening24 of the central body (Conseil National des Universit?s, 
CNU) which intervenes on recruitment and promotion decision-mak 
ing: it gave more leeway to the department level (but not so much to the 
university level). A second one dealt with some distance taken vis-?-vis 
the egalitarian model through the introduction in 1990 of "bonuses"25 
rewarding some distinguished performance in research,26 or in teach 
ing,27 or in administrative activities. The conditions to be fulfilled are 
rather clearly defined and do not leave much leeway to the institu 
tions,28 but it suggests that academic staff may be differently committed 
to various activities and that selective reward may be granted for them. 
A less achieved evolution can also be seen in the recent promotion of 
teaching assessment.29 Few institutions really invest in it (Dejean 2002) 
and it is poorly related to any kind of reward, but one should not 
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underestimate this experiment: if teaching assessment is to develop it 
would introduce some regular and compelling evaluation. 
This trend toward the acceptance of more differentiated careers and 
the allocation of more management tools to higher education institu 
tions is reflected in the content of the recent report of the University 
president Eric Esperet (2001): it suggests giving the universities the 
opportunity to negotiate different contracts with their academic staff, 
instead of acting as if academics were all spending 50% of their time for 
teaching and 50% for research. Some faculty members should be al 
lowed to have lighter teaching duties, while others would have more 
pedagogical activities. Reflection is currently concerned with how to 
transform this report into action. 
The on-going process is less spectacular in France than in Germany, 
but one can see the seeds of change and a move towards a stronger role 
of universities in staff management, as well as towards the introduction 
of new incentive mechanisms and more diversified internal career 
developments. 
A general trend within European academic labor markets 
This evolution can be observed in many other European countries. 
Higher education institutions are more and more involved in the 
management of their faculty staff, developing new tools and making 
decisions about position creations, suppressions or transformations: 
their intervention in faculty careers is more and more frequent. Some 
reforms (such as the suppression of tenure in the UK, or in Austria) also 
seek to give more flexibility to universities in staff management, either 
by avoiding "forever" employment contracts or by increasing the ratio 
between non-permanent staff and tenured teachers. 
The influence of "new managerialism" on higher education institu 
tions also introduced some new practices: from weekly reporting in 
some British universities, to regular assessment of research activities, 
teaching records based on student evaluation and the imposed (Austria) 
or proposed (Switzerland) assistance services which have been devel 
oped in case of bad results. 
Since going into detail, country by country, would be tedious, I shall 
keep to this rather impressionistic presentation and try to show that this 
general trend raises common questions because it aims at a converging 
orientation and has comparable implications. 
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The deeper transformations resulting from the new regulations 
As stressed above, the characteristics of academic labor markets and the 
mechanisms and principles through which they operate, go beyond an 
analytic presentation of rules, periods, modalities and regulations. They 
also reveal different societal (Maurice, et al. 1982; Maurice and Sorge 
2000) conceptions and structures within the academic profession. 
Therefore the resulting transformations should not be considered as 
"simple" changes in the rules. On the contrary, we have to discuss the 
deeper implications they have. 
Changing professional models 
The modifications strongly affect national professional models. The 
formerly egalitarian French model which allowed symbolic and repu 
tational differentiation but low status and income dispersion is not yet 
strongly threatened by the rather peripheral new measures which were 
introduced. But if the current projects were implemented they would 
deeply modify it. More differentiation among French academics, more 
accountability and assessment devices and the developing role of uni 
versity leadership in such mechanisms would impact on the relation 
ships among academics and in creating a stronger link between each 
academic and his/her institution. 
What is at stake is even more acute in the German case. Because of the 
regressive budget of German universities, each creation of a junior 
professorship involves the suppression of an assistant position. It means 
less manpower to hand for tenured professors and modifies the "implicit 
contract" on which the previous professional model was based, i.e., the 
acceptance of the long, risky and dependent pre-tenure period in ex 
change for financial and human resources to develop one's own research 
thereafter. What will be the reaction of recently recruited professors 
towards the Juniorprofessoren? Will the latter experience a less mandarin 
like situation? If so, i.e., if Juniorprofessoren are not considered as 
apprentices, a further consequence will probably be a blurring of the 
division of work between them and tenured professors, but also 
increasing competition between the latter and this "new" Mittelbau who 
will no more work for the professors but for themselves. At the same time 
professors will have to compete vigorously to "obtain" some of the 
remaining assistant positions. These reforms can thus impact on the 
division of work, the tenured/non tenured relationships, the socialization 
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process in pursuit of an to academic career, i.e., the whole German 
professional model. 
As for merit salary, the crucial points are whether important differ 
ences will be made among faculty members and who will make such 
decisions. If universities happen to be able to develop institutional wage 
policies, it is not very difficult to imagine the impact it can have on the 
university /professor relationships! 
As a consequence, the new rules which have been introduced to the 
academic labor markets are reshaping the national professional models. 
Weakening academic regulation vs transformed relationships between 
universities and academics 
A further general conclusion implicitly presented in this paper is the 
already frequently developed (Dearlove 1997; Fulton 1994; Kogan and 
Hanney 2000; Reed 2001) argument about the threat of the diminishing 
power of academia. The UK is here particularly representative of the 
deployed forces "against" academic self-regulation. The changes I 
described lead to this conclusion as well. 
This should not be overstated: academics often remain the main 
deciders. When recruitment formally requires an approval from the 
university leadership, it is more formal than really intrusive.30 
Nevertheless, the autonomy left to the faculty members on these issues 
is now reduced and they must cope with "external" constraints. 
Departments make decisions "by themselves" but in fact "freely" 
introduce considerations they feel they must take into account. For 
instance, French departments ask for the creation of positions in sub 
disciplines which are understaffed, not always because it is important 
for the future of the discipline, but because they know that being under 
staffed is a decisive argument for getting new posts. And in Germany, 
departments threatened by the suppression of posts "decide" to modify 
their scientific and pedagogical aspirations and, consequently, the pro 
file of the candidate they are looking for. The academic profession has 
more and more to cope with institutional constraints and their inte 
gration into "its" criteria, which is an insidious way of lessening aca 
demic independence. 
More frontal and direct attacks also emerge from the growing 
influence of institutions on career development and activity assessment. 
This concerns the increasing possibilities and legitimacy of intervention 
with academics of higher institutions through instruments and devices 
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aiming at better controlling, monitoring, evaluating. And this competes 
with traditional academic preferences and criteria. 
The main consequence of this evolution is the transformation of the 
nature of the university/academics relationship. In the Humboldtian 
tradition, universities were expected to promote the unity of knowledge 
under the same roof (among many others, see Nybom forthcoming or 
Renaut 1995). They thus had a kind of metaphysical role and the "idea 
of University" was more important than the physical structures or the 
material links between the faculties. It is nowadays the opposite: uni 
versities establish overarching functions by looking more and more like 
organizations (Musselin 2002), by introducing similar constraints on 
the university staff, by defining criteria and norms to be applied to 
academic activities, by ensuring that these criteria and norms are 
respected, and by developing an employer/wage earner relationship. 
While European higher education systems (by comparison with the 
American one31) were characterized by weak institutional regulation 
and a dominant professional regulation, they recently experienced the 
emergence of the former and its increasing development and the related 
weakening of the latter. Both forms are now to be found and combine 
in a more or less antagonistic way within universities, so that even if 
academics still define themselves in relation to their respective 
discipline(s), they cannot escape or ignore the more wage-earner type 
relationship linking them to their institution. 
The transformation of academic activities into academic work 
This finally questions the evolution of the nature of academic activities. 
The development of employer/wage earner relationships is possible if 
and only if research and teaching are considered as "work". 
In the Mertonian conception of the scientist (for instance Merton 
1962), the idea prevails that research and teaching, as well as artistic 
activities, were chosen by a "calling" (i?w/being a literal translation for 
that in German), and as such were characterized by disinterestedness 
and the search for "Truth". A well structured socialization and strong 
professional control were enough to maintain the respect for scientific 
norms; and the principal measurement of performance was scientific 
progress, defined by discoveries, new laws, new theories, new concepts. 
In this conception, research clearly dominated teaching, the latter 
being a kind of natural by-product of the former and both activities 
were considered as different from (industrial) "work" in many ways. 
First they do not refer to any core technology: research processes and 
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teaching practices cannot be prescribed, they depend much more on 
individual talent than on transferable instruments or prescriptions: they 
can hardly be replicated. Second, they are difficult to evaluate: their 
assessment relies more on judgement than on indicators; and the causal 
links between the way these activities are developed and their result is 
said to be loosely coupled. 
It is questioned nowadays. Or at least, the arguments protecting 
academic activities from instruments and practices usual for non-aca 
demic work do not work anymore. Recent evolution tends to foster 
productivity indicators (see for instance RAE procedure in the UK), to 
promote weekly reporting, to develop teaching methods, to extend 
quality assessment. 
I thus come to a conclusion which is quite convergent with the one 
developed by Menger (2002) about artistic activities: the difference be 
tween artistic/academic activities and "work" is narrowing. But in the 
case of academics, I disagree with his interpretation. He argues that 
"creative artistic activities are no longer the reverse side of work, but are 
more and more claimed to be the more advanced expression of new 
modes of production and of new work relation" (Menger 2002: 8, my 
translation). In the case of academic activities we increasingly see a 
diffusion of techniques, measures and procedures which previously were 
specific to non-academic work. 
Concluding discussion 
European academic labor markets are experiencing many changes 
aiming at similar objectives: the establishment of better regulated 
internal labor markets and the affirmed role of the university level in the 
management of the newly introduced incentive mechanisms. This gen 
eral trend carries with it comparable implications: it modifies the pro 
fessional models on which each national academic labor market was 
built; it leads to the weakening of professional regulations and to the 
emergence of institutional regulations which have to combine with the 
former, and it implies the transformation of academic activities into 
academic work, while academics become wage-earner professionals. 
Among the many issues raised by this on-going evolution two seem 
particularly promising for future investigations, and I would like to 
finish with them. 
The first one concerns the compatibility of this transformation 
with other changes affecting higher education. For instance, one can 
EUROPEAN ACADEMIC LABOR MARKETS 149 
see the emergence of more regulated academic labor markets in 
European universities as consistent with the shift in the status of 
knowledge: because the latter is supposed/expected to be more closely 
linked to society's needs and demands, one can expect more control 
and incentives to be introduced in academic work. But at the same 
time there clearly exists a contradiction between more organized 
universities, stimulating institutional commitment and the fact that, 
simultaneously research activities are expected to increasingly develop 
through networks, inter-disciplinarity, flexibility. At the individual 
level (lay academic) the tension between stronger links to the insti 
tution and the adaptability required by scientific activities increases. 
Moreover we can expect research to be more resistant than teaching 
to a transformation into "work" and to organizational control32 as it 
relies on individual expertise and skills: as stressed by Reed (2001), 
new managerialism can produce counter effects and affect creativity 
and innovation if too narrowly implemented on professionals. A 
balance has thus to be found between professional regulations and 
the emerging institutional ones. 
The second perspective concerns the influence of the development of 
more regulated internal labor markets within universities on the content 
of academic activities as well as on their production process. Most of the 
time the teaching and research agendas are described as more and more 
constrained by external factors (pressures from the job-market, from 
stakeholders); and the type of knowledge produced is understood as a 
reflection of the autonomy academics can mobilize vis-?-vis those 
external demands. But this individual autonomy is also more and more 
restricted by internal institutional devices: the impact of the latter 
should not be neglected and should be further explored. More precisely, 
their influence on the management of the research/teaching/services mix 
as well as on the kind of knowledge produced and taught should be 
observed. Their (collusive or contradictory) interplay with the external 
constraints should also be studied. 
Notes 
1. The diminishing percent of tenure-track and tenured positions in universities (Chait 
2002) and in firms (see for instance Menger 2002; Osterman 2002) will not be 
discussed here. 
2. More than 200 interviews were held with lay academics, chairs and deans displayed 
in two disciplines (history and mathematics) and three countries (France, Germany 
and the US): 22 departments within 18 universities were under study (Blangy and 
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Musselin 1996; Fresse 1998, 1999; Hanin 1994; Musselin 2000b; de Oliveira 1998). I 
am finishing a book drawing on these studies (Musselin forthcoming). I chose to 
explore traditional disciplines such as history and mathematics because the main 
research issue was on decision-making in hiring committees and I wanted to study 
cases where the non-academic labor markets play little role. For this paper this 
choice also happens to be relevant because the hypothesis can be made that if the 
change I discuss here is to be observed in traditional disciplines, it is even more 
important in the others. 
3. Tournaments describe situations where the performance of each candidate cannot 
be clearly and efficiently measured. In such a case, the best solution is to compare 
the respective quality of the candidate rather than trying to measure it. 
4. This is the case in American universities with the passage from associate to full 
professorship. 
5. According to economists (see for instance O'Flaherty and Siow 1992, 1995), this 
mechanism deals with cases where the competence of junior staff can only be as 
sessed in situ. 
6. For instance, in a large majority of American universities tenure is close to the 
satisfaction of criteria mechanism, but the letters of recommendation or the eval 
uation of the dossiers by external experts introduce some kind of comparative 
assessment. Furthermore in the very top research universities the tenure process is 
closer to a tournament and relies on competition among many candidates. 
7. This definition is rather literal and primary by lack of space to discuss it further. For 
an exploration of the specificities of universities as internal labor markets see 
Sorensen (1993). 
8. Academic labor markets thus belong to what L. Karpik defined as an "economics of 
quality" (Karpik 1989). 
9. In the three private American universities I studied, the negotiation occurred be 
tween the dean and the department chair who represented the candidate. 
10. The French academic profession is regulated by the decree 84-431 published in 
1984, but many incremental changes have been introduced in this text over time. 
11. Not all of them. In France many doctoral students (more in humanities than in 
science) prepare their thesis with no fellowship (allocation de recherche) from the 
university. 
12. They are mostly dedicated to doctoral students on the verge of finishing their PhD 
or to new doctors. 
13. Varying from one discipline to another, and from one department to another. 
14. This feeling was also very strongly expressed by German non-tenured assistants. On 
the contrary, the American assistant professors I interviewed did not have this 
feeling. 
15. There are no public data on how many academics are concerned, but in the ministry 
statistics (Note d'information, 2002), 15.4% of this category is 55 years old or 
more. 
16. In some disciplines (mostly law, economics, political science, business administra 
tion) the access to professorship depends on success in a national examination 
called agr?gation du sup?rieur. A limited number of positions are open for this 
concourse. The first ranked successful candidate chooses the position s/he prefers 
among the open ones, then the second on the list does the same etc. It is thus rare 
for a candidate to be a professor in the university where he was ma?tre de confer 
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enees and institutional mobility is (almost) systematically associated with promo 
tion to professorship. 
17. There exist limited exceptions. A reputed scientific university decided to allocate 
some start-up funds for new recruited persons. Another one received financial 
support from local authorities to propose interesting housing facilities. 
18. The CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) and the INSERM 
(Institut National de la Sant? et de la Recherche Scientifique) are public institutions 
created respectively in 1939 and 1964. They are mostly dedicated to fundamental 
research in all disciplines for the CNRS and in life sciences for the INSERM. They 
partly or completely finance many research centers which are often located within 
universities (but not always) and have their own tenured research staff (about 
11,800 for the CNRS, 2200 for the INSERM). Other research institutions of this 
kind exist such as the INRA for agronomical research, the CNES for space 
activities, etc. 
19. With important variations from one university to another (large scientific univer 
sities practice less local recruitment than humanities predominant universities) and 
of course from one discipline to another (disciplines with agr?gation du sup?rieur 
have less local recruitment than humanities and science). 
20. In Germany the academic profession is regulated by the Hochschulrahmengesetz 
(which was modified in 2001 by the F?nftes Gesetz zur ?nderung des Hochschul 
rahmengesetzes) and the Hoschuldienstrecht. 
21. All the more so as such hiring decisions very much depend on each professor: there 
is no collective decision making. 
22. Cf. the F?nftes Gesetz zur ?nderung des Hochschulrahmengesetzes und anderer 
Vorschriften 5. HRG?ndG, February the 16th 2002. 
23. This is the German term. 
24. Instead of ranking the candidates, the CNU now evaluates the dossier of the 
doctors who intend to apply for a ma?tre de conf?rences position and of the ma?tres 
de conf?rences who intend to apply for a professor position. It decides whether they 
are enough qualified or not to apply for such positions. Furthermore, half of the 
positions open for promotion are left to the universities which can decide whom 
they want to promote. The rest of the positions open for promotion is allocated by 
the CNU. 
25. Decrees 90-49, 90-50, 90-51 of January the 12th 1990, published in the Journal 
Officiel of January 12-14 1990. 
26. Mostly measured by the number of doctors "produced" each year by the concerned 
academic. It reaches 3336 a year for ma?tres de conf?rences, 4819 for second 
class professors and 6302 for first class professors. 
27. This was first measured according to a number of teaching hours given above the 
standard duty. Now it is reserved for academics developing specific pedagogical 
activities which are not presential teaching. It can reach between 456 and 3530 
each year. 
28. Nevertheless, the decision to grant a doctoral bonus to someone is made by experts 
at the ministry level. 
29. French academics distinguish "teaching assessment" (?valuation de l'enseignement) 
from "teacher assessment" (?valuation de l'enseignant). In a survey made for the 
Agence de Mutualisation des Universit?s et des Etablissements, AMUE in 1999 
(Mignot-G?rard and Musselin 2000), 88.4% of about 1000 academics who an 
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swered declared they were in favor of teaching assessment. But they expressed 
strong reluctance towards "teacher assessment". 
30. In Germany for instance the members of the hiring committees often mentioned the 
possibility for the university/ministry to modify their choice but very few were able 
to quote a concrete case (or they all quoted the same case). The same holds true for 
the American cases I studied. In the four departments, very few cases were men 
tioned where the university did not follow the department decisions about 
recruitment, tenure or promotions (Musselin 2000b). 
31. For instance organizational sagas as defined by B. Clark (1983) are rarer in Europe. 
32. Organizational studies of American universities (for instance Blau 1973; Brisset 
Sillion 1997; Chait 2002) all conclude that stronger administrative control develops 
better in teaching institutions than in research universities 
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